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Abstract. This paper expands upon a hitherto under-explored finding by Rich and 
Banerjee’s (2015) model which finds that Taiwan has done comparatively better 
with non-democracies in Africa. The paper proposes that democratisation makes 
an African state more responsive to domestic economic imperatives and thus more 
likely to form relations with the demographically and economically larger 
People’s Republic of China due to the prospective trade, aid and investment gains 
to be made once such a switch is affected. Seven case studies conducted over the 
2001-2018 period yield results which are in line with this hypothesis. 
Keywords: Africa-China relations, Africa-Taiwan relations, democratisation, one 
China policy 
1. Introduction 
Democracy in Africa is something of a crucible for the China-Africa relationship. On one 
hand, many reform-minded scholars, international organisations, and western governments 
criticise China for its indifference to the level of democracy within the African states it deals 
with. On the other hand, work by Timothy S. Rich and Vasabjit Banerjee (2015), who carry 
out a large-N study seeking to identify variables which lead African states to have relations 
with China over Taiwan and vice versa, finds that in the continent Taiwan tended to be more 
recognised by states that were non-democratic. What mechanisms may underline such a 
phenomenon? Pre-existing and subsequent literature, however, has not answered this and has 
thus far placed much emphasis on the economic factors; namely, that African countries have 
recognised China because of its economic strengths. However, the continent has had 
domestic governance changes that began in the 1990s – the so-called Third Wave of 
democratisation (Huntington, 1991) – and culminated in the 2000s, which merit analysis 
alongside the one China issue. 
This paper proposes that perhaps some combination of these two factors could be at play. 
Namely, regime change and multiparty competition in newly democratised states may have 
ushered in competitive democratic politics and free media which may have led to the African 
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states being more likely to respond to the domestically-rooted and socially-distributed 
opportunity costs of not recognising the demographically larger PRC over the smaller and 
economically stagnating ROC. This is especially plausible in light of the 
developmental/poverty-reduction concerns that permeate African states. In this paper, case 
study analyses into this found that that leaders in new democracies switched to China for 
economic and developmental rationales. Indeed, all new democracies on the continent in the 
twenty-first century – Liberia, Gambia, and Burkina Faso – have gone on to switch to China 
within one to three years of democratisation. Of the three states that were not new 
democracies but still switched (i.e., Senegal, Chad and Malawi), two (Chad and Malawi) did 
so within a year of an upcoming election following a declining performance in the preceding 
presidential election by the incumbents. Senegal on the other hand switched to the PRC not in 
the context of an election and, moreover, in the midst of a growing economy. This would 
appear to make the country an outlier. However, its switch, in 2005, took place a year prior to 
the Forum on China-Africa-Cooperation (FOCAC) summit of 2006 where it had been invited 
despite its Taiwan alignment. The country subsequently had its China-bound exports grow; 
from US$78-million in 2005, the year of the switch, to US$161-million by 2016; 
additionally, the country also gained interest-free loans from China (Menjor, 2017) and has 
subsequently been appointed co-chair of FOCAC (2018-2021). 
It is evident, however, that some literature has noted that despite democratising many African 
states have remained characterised by corrupt governments. Even in such a landscape, 
however, the paper proposes that the process of democratisation is accompanied by an 
expansion of the elite and thus the necessity of the recognition of China if there are to be 
consummately increased rents. The Gambian case is interesting in this regard because 
although under an autocratic government when the country initially unsuccessfully reached 
out to China in 2015, the country was also anticipating what proved to be the freest election 
in its history, set to take place in 2016. The decision to relent relations with the ROC within a 
year of the election also perhaps indicates a desire to economically gain from the PRC and 
therefore resuscitate the economy, which had reached a technical recession in 2014, at -
0.94%. This was the second such recession in three years, as 2011 had also seen a nominal 
GDP decline of -4.295%, along with a GDP per capita decline of -7.141% in the same year 
(World Bank, 2019). 
Given the findings in the 7 case studies, we could deduce that the process of democratisation 
or regime change (or a weakened autocracy, as in the case of pre-2017 Gambia) in a given 
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African state in either case is a critical determinant of recognition of China in the twenty-first 
century; with those now in power expecting that the new relations with mainland China will 
lead to increased trade and in turn translate these into domestic electoral dividends. 
Importantly, this article’s thesis is not that China increases democracy on the continent. 
Rather, it is the other way around: democratisation and electoral competitiveness in African 
states in the twenty-first century has led to recognition of China (which was in turn ascribed 
the role of dependent variable). The data has proved this, and not necessarily the reverse. 
This paper thus draws a causal interaction among three notable trends of the late 1990s that 
culminated in the 2000s whose interconnectedness has thus far been underexplored; the “third 
wave of democratisation” (Huntington, 1991), which also saw the emergence of multiparty 
politics in many countries in Africa, the economic rise of China, and the decline of 
Taiwanese recognition in the continent, with only one country, the Kingdom of eSwatini, 
maintaining diplomatic relations with Taipei. 
The second section of the article will offer a historical background on the origins and 
evolution of the one China problem. The third will review the existing literature on Africa’s 
switches from Taiwan to China. The fourth section gives an account of the methodology used 
and the data requirements of the paper. The fourth tests the hypothesis by conducting case 
study analyses on countries which recently democratised or had recently gone into elections 
just prior to affecting a switch in their relations: Liberia, Gambia, and Burkina Faso in the 
examples of the former cases, and Chad, Malawi and São Tomé and Príncipe as examples of 
the latter. The paper then concludes with a synthesis of the findings as well as considers some 
potential caveats to the hypothesis. These are in turn funnelled into working hypotheses that 
incorporate them into the present findings. 
2. Background 
As a consequence of losing the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), China was forced to 
hand over to the emerging Japanese Empire an island some 110 miles off its coast known as 
Taiwan (and referred to as ‘Formosa’ by Japan), as a concession. This was a transformative 
period in world affairs, and still, more transformative times were ahead. In the midst of a civil 
war that came on the heels of the fall of the Qing Dynasty (1911) between the Kuomintang 
Party-run government of the Republic of China and the 1921-formed Communist Party of 
China (with the People’s Liberation Army, founded in 1927, as its military wing), Japan 
decided to annex the northeast of mainland China in 1931 – though some debate rages as to 
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whether this was an invasion of ‘China’ (as a unitary entity) or of ‘Manchuria’ as its own de 
facto independent entity, as the central government had a very limited reach in the northeast 
of China, which was run by numerous military cliques (warlord groupings) at the time 
(Kissinger, 2012: 88). Nevertheless, both the Kuomintang government and the Communists 
interpreted this as an act of invasion and ceased hostilities and formed an alliance against 
Japan. On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour, thereby dragging the US 
into the world conflict. This marked the opening of the Pacific front of World War II, which 
culminated in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear attacks that resulted in the surrender of 
Japan and an effective end of the war in 1945. 
With the common enemy gone, the Kuomintang and the Communists once again resumed 
their fighting for sole control of China. The end for the Kuomintang finally came on October 
1, 1949, with victory for the Communists and the declaration of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC). In some sense, however, this marked a new beginning for the Kuomintang, as 
massive numbers among them, and particularly their leadership in the person of Chiang Kai-
shek fled to the island of Taiwan. A planned invasion by the Communists was repelled by the 
presence of the United States, a firm ally to the anti-Communist Kuomintang. Persistently, 
the Kuomintang proclaimed itself as still being the government of all Chinese peoples on 
both the island as well as on the mainland and still ruling what they proclaimed as the 
“Republic of China” from the island of Taiwan. The PRC claimed the same. Thus both 
entities claimed to be the ‘One China’ and began a process of competing for recognition 
among states in the international community. Brautigan (2009: 22) observes that ‘while 
China has frequently emphasized the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, the 
“One China Policy” has remained the prominent exception to the rule. The absence of 
diplomatic ties with Taiwan is a precondition for any fruitful diplomatic relations with 
Beijing.’ Extreme measures have also been taken, as “numerous historical examples have 
shown that diplomatic ties are cut off and economic aid is suspended if a country establishes 
diplomatic ties with Taiwan” (Brautigam, 2009). Initially, the US and its allies recognised 
Taiwan (whose leader had been a signatory to the UN Charter), as did a number of other 
states in the world, including some African states. A major shift came in 1971 when an 
Albania-initiated United Nations General Assembly resolution (Resolution 1668) to replace 
the ROC (which will be referred to as ‘Taiwan’ for the remainder of the article) with the PRC 
(which will be referred to as ‘China’ for the remainder of the article) as the representative of 
China passed. 
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Over the subsequent five decades, Taiwan has shed allies and recognisers (though the US 
remains an important military backer with no official recognition since 1979) and presently 
only has 17 formal diplomatic relations in the world, and only 1 in the African continent (the 
Kingdom of eSwatini, formerly known as Swaziland). Since 2000, African countries have 
overwhelmingly recognized China as opposed to Taiwan including Liberia, Chad, Senegal, 
Malawi, Gambia, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Burkina Faso. Beijing has reportedly made 
overtures to eSwatini. Interestingly, many of these states were initially reached out to either 
through the platform of the FOCAC, or reportedly by promises of foreign aid as well as, for 
the conflict-ridden countries (e.g. Liberia and Chad), assistance through the UN Security 
Council, where China obtained a permanent seat in 1971. Furthermore, China’s seriousness 
about reincorporating Taiwan has been on display recently with China’s president, Xi 
Jinping, issuing in January 2019 a statement to Taiwan’s leaders which called for peaceful 
reunification, but made it clear that “China reserved the option of using force if Taiwan didn’t 
go along” (Van der Wees, 2019; January 3). 
3. ‘Dollar diplomacy’: A Literature review 
At the end of the Cold War, Copper (1995: 222) correctly observed that Taiwan tends to have 
smaller relations, but in at least one book and one paper came to the incorrect conclusion that 
“future trends in this regard probably favour the ROC, particularly given the fact, among 
other reasons, the PRC’s relations with the Third World are generally tenuous owing to 
Beijing’s becoming a major recipient of aid and loans from international lending institutions 
while absorbing large quantities of private investment capital, to the detriment of other 
developing nations.” This grew from a retrospective application of ideology on the question 
of the recognition of Taiwan borne from an association between these states’ small size as 
well as that of Taiwan’s own small size; “many smaller nations side with the ROC (also a 
small nation) saying that its sovereignty should be protected against a larger aggressive 
nation. More importantly, they support the idea of self-determination and apply that principle 
to Taiwan” (Copper, 1995: 225). This has not been the case however, at least on the African 
continent. Rich and Banerjee (2015: 141) perceptively observe that “whereas Cold War 
rationales initially benefitted Taiwan, economic interests now appear to incentivize African 
countries to establish relations with China. Through qualitative and quantitative data covering 
much of the post-World War II era, [their analysis] argues that economic factors have 
trumped political rationales for Taiwanese–African relations.” Incumbent upon such a 
question is an assumption – that one of the two states has marginally more to offer than the 
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other. It is thus worth elucidating whether that can be stated to be the case through a number 
of measurement tools.  
The first such tool is the World Economic Forum (WEF) Competitiveness Index scores, 
while the second is comparative annualised GDP growth. The rationale in utilising these is 
because they are an objective indicator of the differences between the two states in 
comparative economic advantage terms. Table 1 indicates the two states’ scores in the WEF 
Competitiveness reports between 2006 and 2016, the period within which these two African 
states made their respective switches. From the raw score figures, it would appear that the 
ROC has the edge, even if slightly, as shown in Table 1. 
But the value of stronger relations with the PRC (insofar as they are conditioned on 
recognising it over the ROC) are clearer when assessed through the prism of marginal growth 
as seen in Figure 1, which is a graphic representation of the compared marginal growth in 
WEF competitiveness index scores between the ROC and the PRC.  Between 2006 and 2009, 
for example, the ROC’s score declined, though increasingly less for each year, while that of 
the PRC grew, and saw a jump from 54th place to 29th place (a jump of 25 places in total). 
What is also clear is that the PRC’s annual GDP growth, and thus its exporting and importing 
potentials, have been consistently higher than that of the ROC. Similarly, on annualised GDP 
growth rates, the PRC has registered higher increases than the ROC. The ROC peaked at 
close to 15% in 2010, after experiencing a -10% decline in 2009 (coinciding with the global 
economic recession at the time), has grown at 5% or below for the past five years, while the 
PRC peaked at 15% in 2007 and has experienced between 6% and 8% growth rates for the 
past five years.1 Thus, insofar as African states would perform an opportunity cost analysis as 
to which China to recognise, the PRC is a more economically viable option. 
  
                                                        
1 Knomea (2018). ‘GDP of China’ available at: https://knoema.com/atlas/China/Real-GDP-growth (Last 
accessed: 8 December 2018). 
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Table 1: World Economic Forum Competitiveness Index Scores: ROC vs PRC, 2006-
2016. 
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Figure 1: World Economic Forum Competitiveness Index Scores: ROC vs PRC, 2006-
2016. 
Source: WEF Competitiveness Reports Library, 2006-2016. Available at: https://www.weforum.org/reports/ (accessed 11 March 2019). 
Calculations by author. 
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More concretely, in their case study of South Africa, Williams and Hurst (2017: 3) argue that 
“the ROC and PRC were far from passive bystanders” in the first four years of democracy as 
Pretoria was choosing which China to recognise: “the ROC provided first the ANC, and then 
the South African government, with a range of inducements designed to make the case that 
retaining ties with the island government was in South Africa’s best interest.” And as 
Beijing’s impatience with South Africa grew, the PRC’s policymakers “made it increasingly 
clear to their counterparts in Pretoria that if South Africa continued to defer its decision on 
the two Chinas there would be negative implications for its relationship with the PRC” 
(Williams and Hurst 2017: 3). The importance of the use of incentives and coercion is further 
demonstrated in the fact that “the focus of Mandela’s trip to the ROC in late July 1993 was 
fundraising.” And a few days before Mandela visited the island,  
“ANC and ROC officials arranged “That US $10 million will be given to the President 
[Mandela] during his courtesy call at the President’s [Lee Teng-Hui] office at 18h00 just 
before dinner on Friday, July 31.” An ANC official went on to note: “The Question of further 
assistance, whether hard cash or in kind, should be raised during the President’s courtesy calls 
to both the President’s and the Prime Minister’s offices—and not at the public events, (i.e. at 
dinner tables). We understand that the Western way of fundraising, such as passing the hat 
and asking for contributions from individuals/business people in public is something that is 
not done here—they get very embarrassed” (Williams and Hurst, 2017: 11). 
Furthermore, although trade between the ROC and South Africa was at the time larger than 
that between the PRC and South Africa, the combined trade figures of Hong Kong and PRC 
far outweighed those of the ROC (Williams and Hurst, 2017: 21). This “Hong Kong Factor” 
became a central issue within the South African government. According to the erstwhile 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad: “Hong Kong was always our argument… we 
used to say the reality is not just now Mainland but also Hong Kong, at that time we had very 
strong economic and other relations. And that was exactly why the timing was brought in” 
(Williams and Hurst, 2017: 21). Similarly, Ndzendze (2019) has conducted a review of 
Malawi’s exports to China upon switching its recognition and found that the exports 
increased exponentially once a switched was affected (2008; see also Figure 5). Furthermore, 
they surpassed exports to Taiwan, which had previously been more dominants than exports to 
the mainland. 
But political actors are also a consideration in economic rationales, especially on ones 
predicated on diplomatic action. One of Rich and Banerjee’s interests in their seminal study 
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was the relationship between a given African country’s domestic structure and the likelihood 
of recognising either the island or the mainland. Differences in Polity IV scores between each 
African country and Taiwan acted as the operational proxy. In this regard, Rich and Banerjee 
found that 
 “Where Taiwan and the African country had the same Polity score (and thus an absolute 
difference of zero), the predicted probability that the African country recognized Taiwan was 
only 5.7 per cent during the Cold War, dropping to 3.31 per cent after 1991. At the other 
extreme (a 19-point difference in Polity scores), the predicted probability of recognizing 
Taiwan reaches 15.74 per cent during the Cold War, but only 10.34 per cent later” (pp. 154). 
Furthermore, 
 “the absolute difference in Polity scores does reach statistical significance at .01, with a 
coefficient that appears counterintuitive: As the differences between Taiwan and African 
countries increase, recognition of the ROC is more likely. Additional tests show that this 
pattern is consistent during the Cold War and in both Taiwan’s authoritarian and democratic 
eras, in stark contrast to claims that Taiwan’s democratization allowed it to hold onto allies” 
(pp. 155). 
Their conclusion is that “these counter-intuitive findings suggest that Taiwan’s ability to 
maintain allies had little to do with similarities in political systems” (p. 154; emphasis added) 
They offer no further hypothesis in this regard. However, the finding that mainly autocracies 
had relations with Taiwan is only descriptive, and while a curious finding, it says little 
outside itself. Further, the authors and other academic works subsequent to this finding, have 
made no attempt to hypothesise as to why that might be – could it be perhaps because Taiwan 
was generally so isolated that it was in no position to impose conditions on the states that 
recognised it and thus “convert “ them? This is particularly interesting in light of mainland 
China’s own selling point as a non-interfering partner for African states, autocratic or 
otherwise. 
Against this background, this paper seeks to test a hypothesis extending the above literature. 
The methodology for doing so is outlined below. 
4. Methods 
This study is interested in the causal linkage between democratisation and the recognition of 
China by African countries in the 2000s. Thus, the research question of this paper is as 
follows: have all newly democratised states in Africa subsequently switched their recognition 
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from Taiwan to China? A sub-question within this question is: is there an association 
between electoral accountability, the prospect of economic gain in recognising China and its 
subsequent recognition? 
This is based on a conceptual framework which is drawn from a body of literature which 
conceives of economic performance as a legitimising pathway for new democracies. As the 
Afrobarometer observes, “A key question confronting states that have recently transitioned 
from authoritarian rule is how to legitimate institutions of the state. No  longer charged with 
serving the narrow interests of a strong and powerful minority, state institutions are often 
faced with the challenge of transforming in a way that allows them to garner the trust and 
willing obedience of the majority” (Carter, 2011: 3). In turn, the same paper concludes that 
“that those who give the government positive ratings on the provision of key political goods 
will be more likely to view the state as legitimate” (p. 1; see also Barro, 1994: 1). 
Variables 
This study makes use of case studies by probing the role of democratisation in leading up to 
the recognition of China by African states. It is essentially an associative study that draws a 
causal inference which casts democratisation as an independent variable, and the recognition 
of China as the dependent variable. 
Case selection 
The case studies include those countries which became democracies in the 2000s noting that 
whenever there has been democratisation, the recognition of China has soon followed within 
a 1-3 year timeframe. This was the case in Liberia, Gambia and Burkina Faso. So far, all the 
continent’s new democracies have subsequently gone on to recognise China. The paper 
presents and tests a causal hypotheses as to why this may be the case. In line with that, the 
paper also postulates that the states which were not new democracies but nonetheless 
switched from Taiwan to China – i.e., Chad and Malawi – did so as a result of popular, 
election-linked developmental imperatives. 
This paper is thus a collection of case studies along two variable which deduce an apparent 
causal association between them and proposes pathways for how they may have interacted; 
that is, how (in the case of each African state) democratisation brought about recognition of 
China. 
Democracy conceptualised 
12 
 
In this article, we understand ‘democracy’ in its political terms rather than in economic, 
cultural or social manifestations. Democracy, termed by Dahl (1971) as ‘polyarchy,’ is 
characterised by the presence of political procedures that facilitate (or at least ‘provide 
opportunities’ for) universal adult participation in the political process through competitive 
elections where there is a likelihood that those in power could be removed (Dahl 1971: 
38). Further, these rights of participation must be enshrined in the legal and constitutional 
framework of the country in question. Thus, throughout this chapter we proceed with a 
minimalist conception of political (rather than ‘cultural’ or perhaps even ‘economic’) 
democracy. Thus the Freedom House is a viable proxy for qualifying these. The new 
democracies, Liberia, Burkina Faso and The Gambia saw their Freedom House scores 
improve, respectively to 60/100, 56/100, and 46/100 (partly free), with all three having free 
and fair elections for the first time, whilst the rest of the dataset continued to hold 
elections, with scores between 84/100 (São Tomé and Príncipe), 62/100 (Malawi) and 
71/100 (Senegal), though Chad being classified as not free (scoring 17/100) in recent years 
(Freedom House, 2020). 
5. Analysis: African democracies, elites and the one China policy 
The literature review has yielded economics as the predominant reason for African states’ 
switches from Taiwan to PRC in the late 1990s and 2000s. At the same time, however, 
democracy was found to be on the rise in the continent. These two factors have been looked 
at separately, but perhaps some combination of these factors could be at play: the regime 
change in a newly democratised state could usher in competitive democratic politics (and 
thus rational self-interest among the political elite [Tomz, 2007: 821]) which may have led to 
the African states being more likely to respond to the opportunity cost of not recognising the 
much larger PRC; especially an economic one, underlined by developmental/poverty-
reduction concerns in African states). Thus, we could deduce that the process of 
democratisation, as well as regime change in a given state, is a direct determinant of 
recognition of China in the twenty-first century; with those now in power expecting that the 
new relations with China will lead to increased trade and reap domestic electoral dividends. 
Case Study 1: Liberia (2001) 
Liberia has had an unmatched level of inconsistency with regards to the One China problem 
(see time series below) – a reflection perhaps of the level of instability within that country; 
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the site of two deadly, ethnic- and resource-fuelled civil wars which left close to a million 
dead in their wake, in a country of historically no more than three million.  
The PRC formed formal relations with the Republic of Liberia on February 17, 1977, and 
from 1977 to 1989, the PRC’s main economic activity was the provision of education 
scholarships to Liberian students (China Daily, 2007: 1). But a decade later, in October of 
1989 President Samuel Doe issued a “Joint Communique on the Reestablishment of 
Diplomatic Relations with the Republic of China”. Consequently, the PRC suspended 
relations with the West African country. Four years later, on August 10th of 1993, formal 
relations between the PRC and Liberia were once again resumed. On September 5, 1997, 
however, Liberia, under erstwhile President Charles Taylor sought to recognise both the “two 
Chinas”. Beijing, unwilling to accommodate such an arrangement, on September 9th, once 
more suspended the diplomatic relations with Liberia (China Daily, 2007: 1). But relations 
with Beijing were reactivated in 2003 by the Provisional Government of Liberia, when it 
signed a joint communique on the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries (PRC, 2003: 1), “with Beijing sending a generous aid package to Liberia soon after 
Monrovia switched its relations” (Taylor, 2015: 45-46). As the country was just emerging 
from the brutal second Liberian civil war which had begun in 1999, Beijing’s permanent seat 
in the UNSC “and the possibilities this could provide the country in its post-war 
reconstruction, as well as China’s desire to access Liberian resources” were deemed to be 
deciding additional factors (Taylor, 2015: 46). As the section below demonstrates, since then, 
the Liberia-China relationship has deepened, to the extent that some scholars now argue that 
“the issue of which China to recognise seems settled,” although the country only received its 
only loan from China (to the value of US$50-million) in 2005, and thus not immediately 
following its switch to China (Taylor, 2015: 46; China-Africa Research Initiative [CARI], 
2020).2 
The PRC’s role the reconstruction of Liberia was evident from the start. The UN Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL) was set by UNSC Resolution 1509 (2003) passed in September of 2003 to 
assist in the implementation of a recently brokered ceasefire (known as the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement [CPA]) as well as to see to the protection of UN personnel, and to support 
humanitarian provisions which were then underway. The mandate of UNMIL also includes a 
mission to support security sector reform, including assistance with national police training 
                                                        
2 This was perhaps demonstrated in an incident wherein the House Speaker, Edwin Melvin Snowe, stated that 
Monrovia could switch back to the ROC, Liberian President Johnson-Sirleaf “swiftly contradicted him” and the 
Speaker was made to resign his position (Taylor, 2015: 46). 
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and the development of a reorganised military. On the other hand, the PRC’s involvement in 
UNMIL has been seen as rather successful soft power campaign, insofar as it has projected a 
positive diplomatic image; to wit, Liberian president Ellen Sirleaf Johnson commended China 
for its peacekeeping in her country, asserting that “Liberians will never forget the friendship 
of Chinese peacekeeping soldiers” (Taylor, 2015: 46). 
Case Study 2: Senegal (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: African Elections Database (2019). 
Senegal’s relations with the PRC commenced in December of 1971. In 1996, however, 
Senegal switched over to the ROC. However, Abdoulaye Wade, a long-standing opposition 
leader (see Figure 4) won the presidency in his country in 2000 and then gained re-election in 
2007 by 55.9% (African Elections Database, 2019). The Wade government sought to pursue 
a less conventional foreign policy and to look east by Senegalese standards (Gehrold and 
Tietze, 2011: 6). Thus, in October of 2005, Senegal reopened formal relations with the PRC, 
which it saw “as a potential export country and a source of investment” (Gehrold and Tietze, 
2011: 3). Thus, regardless of “receiving substantial funding from Taipei, Senegal could no 
longer ignore the omnipresence of the much stronger People’s Republic after the turn of the 
century as it searched for cooperation partners in Africa” (Gehrold and Tietze, 2011: 6). In 
addition, Senegal’s (ultimately unfulfilled) aim of obtaining a temporary seat in the UNSC at 
the time necessitated that it have cordial relations with the PRC qua permanent UNSC 
member. 
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Moreover, the West African state had it as a primary aim to “reap sustainable development 
benefits, especially through an increase in foreign trade, technology imports and knowledge 
transfers” from the PRC (Gehrold and Tietze, 2011: 7). But in some ways, as will be seen, 
Senegal is an outlier for at least two reasons; the lack of immediacy of the switch, taking 
place some two years prior to elections, whilst also, at 2.95%, having had a relatively 
growing economy at the time of the switch (World Bank, 2019c).3 However, the two-year 
window was also the amount of time (in reverse) between the 1993 election and the switch to 
Taiwan in 1995. 
However, viewing the 2005 switch from the perspective of China may be informative; in 
order to obtain access to new funds from China, it was a preconditioned that Senegal open 
relations with the PRC (Gehrold and Tietze, 2011: 7). Since the reopening of relations, yearly 
Senegalese exports to the PRC moved from US$78-million in 2005, the year of the switch, to 
US$161-million in 2016. As it stands, the PRC is currently Senegal’s number-five export 
partner, compared to being its six in 2006 (0.67%).4 Additionally, Senegal had not been a 
recipient of Chinese loans until its switch to China. It received US$50-million in 2006, a year 
following the switch, and US$51-million in 2007, and has been receiving near-consistent 
amounts of loans, which peaked at US$1.102-billion in 2015, before returning to US$182-
million in 2016. In total, the country’s loans to China stand at US$2.019-billion, having only 
started forming since it switched its recognition to China (CARI, 2020). 
Case Study 3: Chad (2006) 
In Chad, we also note that the decision to switch Taiwan came in the wake of elections in 
2006. In the previous year, a referendum had affirmed President Idris Déby’s ability to run 
for a third term. After emerging as leader in a 1990 coup, he had previously won election 
1996 and re-election in 2001. 
Chad and Mainland China formed diplomatic relations in 1972, but these came to an end 
when in 1997 the Chadian government recognised the ROC (Associated Press, 2006). 
Relations with the PRC were once again established in 2006. Acknowledging that the ROC 
would be eliminating relations with Chad, its Foreign Ministry spokesman, Michael Lu, 
                                                        
3 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?locations=SN 
4 MIT. 2019. ‘Where does Senegal export to? (2006)’, MIT Observatory of Economic Complexity. Available at: 
https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/sitc/export/sen/show/all/2006/ (Last accessed: 12 November 2019). 
Compare: MIT. 2019. ‘Where does Senegal export to? (2016)’, MIT Observatory of Economic Complexity. 
Available at: https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/sitc/export/sen/show/all/2016/ (Last accessed: 12 
November 2019). 
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accused the PRC “of using its status as a member of the U.N. Security Council, and its ability 
to influence events in neighbouring Sudan, to persuade Chad to break their formal relations” 
(French and Polgreen, 2007: 1).5 This was in relation to the fact that Chad had already 
planned to cut its ties with the ROC if Beijing had agreed to discontinue its assistance to the 
paramilitary rebels who stood as a threat to the Idris Deby regime in Chad. In a commentary 
loaded with a chilly realism, French and Polgreen (2207: 1) judge that “Chad made the 
compromise for its own survival.”6 The PRC then pledged to support Chad “in its efforts to 
protect the sovereignty of the state and develop the national economy” (French and Polgreen, 
2007: 1). 
PRC-Chad economic relations have grown since the formation of diplomatic relations. Oil 
investment, in particular, overrides the economic ties, “and is seen as the outstanding marker 
of China’s different approach in Chad compared with the French or US engagements, which 
had regarded this investment as unprofitable” (Dittgen and Large, 2013: 2; emphasis added). 
In a matter of a few years, “China has developed into a major player, undertaking a 
distinctive departure from Chad’s previous experience of international oil investment, 
including N’Djamena’s previous troubled partnership with the World Bank over the Chad–
Cameroon pipeline” (Dittgen and Large, 2013: 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 This claim presents an interesting case of indirect contagion, which could be the subject of future research; i.e., 
to discern the role played by the switch of one country onto the subsequent countries in its vicinity. We may 
hypothesize at this early stage, however, that in sight of the lack of linear procession of switches, this may not 
be a factor. 
6 “Regime survival compelled a tactical shift: recognising Beijing would bring myriad short- and longer-term 
advantages. President Déby stood to be empowered by aid, investment and military assistance from a permanent 
UN Security Council member. China was also the key international economic partner, political patron and 
important military ally of Sudan; its support could empower N’Djamena in its then proxy war with Khartoum” 
(Dittgen and Large, 2013: 1). 
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The focal point of the “petro-relations” between the PRC and Chad is the Rônier project, a 
311-km pipeline that connects oilfields in eastern-central Chad to a purpose-built refinery in 
Djarmaya, about 50km north of the capital. Through the national oil company, Société des 
Hydrocarbures du Tchad, the Chadian government is a 40% shareholder of the N’Djamena 
Refinery Company, formed for the specific purposes of managing the refinery, while the 
remaining 60% is for the China National Petroleum Corporation International Chad 
(CNPCIC). The total cost of the project was US$1-billion and began production on schedule 
in March of 2011, and the refinery was initiated not long afterwards in June (Dittgen and 
Large, 2013: 3). In the commencement of production, “oilfield capacity amounted to 20 000 
barrels a day, with a possible increase of up to 60 000 barrels” (Dittgen and Large, 2013: 3). 
By 2013, this had since doubled to 40,000 barrels per day (Dittgen and Large, 2013: 3). 
Chad, which had not received any Chinese loans prior to its switch to China, received 
US$456-million worth of loans from China in 2007, only a year after switching to China 
from Taiwan. The only other loans the country is recorded to have received were US$130-
million and US$4-million in 2012 and 2017 respectively (CARI, 2020). 
The PRC has pursued a path that is “quite different” to the petroleum sector in Chad 
compared to previous western investors, a SAIIA report notes: “Western companies such as 
ExxonMobil and Chevron, as well as Malaysia’s Petronas, have focused exclusively on 
extracting crude for export. With the Rônier project, China has located value-added refining 
processes within Chad itself” (Schellhase, 2013: 1). Furthermore, some scholars have noted 
that on balance, there have been some clear benefits to China’s being in Chad (Schellhase, 
2013), and the PRC has brought and completed several critical infrastructure projects – 
including railways, roads, and hospitals. In June of 2013, two PRC-funded projects, the 
China-Chad Friendship Hospital and a new parliament building were brought to completion 
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and given over to Chad (PRC, 2013: 1). 
Source: United Nations (2019). Calculations by author. 
The PRC also agreed to construct a new international airport in Djarmaya: “This facility will 
be capable of accommodating around one million passengers a year, which will be connected 
to N’Djamena through a 40km highway, also funded and built by the Chinese” (Azevedo and 
Decalo, 2018: 273). 
On the main, therefore, it has been the PRC government, as opposed to purely private 
entities. But relations with the PRC have also seen an increased presence by Chinese 
enterprises: “the Chinese government encourages more Chinese enterprises to come to and 
invest in Chad,” (Yang, 2016: 1). In the absence of the diplomatic relationship, these 
economic gains would not be accrued to Chad; a clear indicator of the opportunity cost 
hypothesised by the article. With Chad, as in the Liberian case study previously looked into, 
the notion of opportunity cost takes on an additional, near existential interface: “It used to be 
that when we had problems with our neighbour sending mercenaries to invade us that none of 
our complaints before the United Nations would pass, because China blocked them,” Chadian 
president has stated (French and Polgreen, 2007: 2). 
Case Study 4: Malawi (2008) 
To interrogate the plausibility and manifestation of this potential mechanism, the section 
below will seek to conduct an opportunity cost analysis for Malawi in the Africa-One China 
nexus. Figure 3 captures the total annualised Malawian exports to the ROC and the PRC 
respectively. What is distinct is that prior to 2008, ROC imports of Malawian goods 
outweighed those by the PRC – on average, by US$18.758-million per year. In the year 2008, 
PRC imports of Malawian goods reached an all-time high (US$8.111-million) and by the 
following year completely eclipsed those of ROC imports of Malawian goods. 
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Source: Ndzendze, Bhaso. 2019 (April 22). ‘Malawi and the One China Policy: 1964–2008,’ E-IR. 
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Source: African Election Database (2019). 
The gains in trade appear to have coincided with gains in the ballot for the ruling United 
Democratic Front (UDF) which won its highest electoral victory to date in the presidential 
election in 2009, the year following the switch to the PRC. It is discernible that the party had 
just obtained a margin of the plurality in the election preceding the switch of 2008. The 
erstwhile president of Malawi, Bingu wa Mutharika, had paid a visit to the PRC shortly after 
establishing diplomatic relations, and upon return he told the country “it would help turn 
Malawi from poverty to riches” (Mweninguwe, 2017: 1), thereby demonstrating a willingness 
to make a trade-off between the recognition of the ROC and that of the PRC which, at least 
the preceding statement would suggest, had resulted in an opportunity cost. During the 
campaign, media noted that while John Tembo, the incumbent president’s principal 
opposition, “enjoyed the united backing of the country's two most established and powerful 
parties—the MCP and the UDF—he faced an incumbent president who had presided over 
strong economic growth of 8%, and the outcome was considered uncertain” (Tenthani, 2009; 
May 17).7 The country also received US$90-million in 2009, a year following its switch from 
Taiwan. 
Ironically, the democratisation in Malawi had at least partially been due to Taiwanese 
sponsorship. In June of 1993 Malawi held a ROC-funded popular referendum, asking 
                                                        
7 Tenthani, Raphael. 2009 (May 17). ‘Malawians go to polls Tuesday in closest-ever polls’, Afrique en ligne. 
Available: https://web.archive.org/web/20090520160717/http://www.afriquejet.com/news/africa-
news/malawians-go-to-polls-tuesday-in-closest-ever-polls-2009051727821.html (Last accessed: 12 November 
2019). 
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whether the country should be a multi-party democratic state. The was a win for the motion, 
upon which the PRC sent an invitation to democratic forces in Malawi to a “goodwill visit” 
(Xinhua, 1994). But the opportunity cost landscape was still favouring Taiwan as soon after, 
as Malawi’s new leader, Bakili Muluzi,  paid a visit to Taipei in April of 1995, and supported 
its UN ambitions in October of 1996 (Free China Journal, 1996). In turn, ROC’s chief 
diplomat paid a reciprocal visit to Malawi and met with its president in January 1997, and 
pledged a donation of some US$2-million for purposes of refurbishing barracks in Lilongwe” 
(Taylor, 2006: 14). 
Case Study 5: The Gambia (2016) 
After obtaining its political self-determination from Britain in 1965, The Gambia opened 
relations with the ROC. However, following the PRC’s assumption of the permanent UNSC 
seat in 1971, the country switched to the PRC. Following the 1994 coup, in 1995, the Gambia 
once again switched back to the ROC. Then suddenly, in 2013, Gambian President Yahya 
Jammeh cut relations with the ROC, “which diplomats said was the result of Taiwan’s refusal 
to increase its foreign aid to his country” (Ramzy, 2016: 1). This was during the diplomatic 
truce and there was a notion of rapprochement with Taiwan (no matter how minimal), 
however, and as a result the PRC “did not immediately resume relations with Gambia in 
order to not be seen as pressuring Taiwan” (Ramzy, 2016: 1). 
But in 2015 the PRC once again rekindled relations with the Gambia; and thereby brought to 
an end the diplomatic truce. According to Wu (2016: 1), this was in response to the end of the 
Ma presidency in Taiwan, which had pursued a rapprochement with the Mainland, as seen in 
the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. In January of that year, there had been a 
“landslide election of the leader of a pro-independence party as the self-ruled island’s 
president” in the person of Tsai Ing-wen (Wu, 2016: 1): 
“The PRC and the ROC had for years tried to poach each other’s allies, often dangling 
generous aid packages in front of leaders of developing nations. But they began an unofficial 
diplomatic truce after signing a series of landmark trade and economic agreements in 2008 
after the election of the China-friendly Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan’s president, as Beijing tried 
to convince Taiwan of its friendly intentions after decades of hostility and suspicion” (Wu, 
2016: 1). 
The Gambian case is therefore quite interesting because it is capable of providing us with a 
scenario in which we have a diplomatic truce – thereby providing what may be regarded as a 
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falsification of the conditions which the paper has claimed to be necessary for the opportunity 
cost in the Africa-One China nexus; the indeterminate state of affairs between 2013 and 2015 
wherein the Gambia had relations with neither the PRC or the ROC, along with the increase 
in trade relations once recognition took place, highlights the role played not just by an 
elimination of diplomatic relations with the ROC, but the formation of relations with the 
PRC. 
The Gambia actually saw a decline in trade relations with the PRC after eliminating trade 
relations with the ROC; although the African country had noted an opportunity cost in having 
relations with Taipei, Beijing was not politically motivated to form relations with Banjul, 
having its own opportunity costs to weigh (i.e., risking a disruption to the rapprochement 
which was taking shape). But, upon the election of the pro-independence leader in the ROC 
and subsequent resumption of relations with Gambia, there was an upsurge of 61% in PRC 
importation of Gambian goods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 
African Election Database (2019). 
The Gambian case is also interesting because though under an autocratic government since 
1994, when the country reached out to China, the country was also anticipating what proved 
to be the freest election in its history, set to take place in 2016. The president, Yahya 
Jammeh, lost the election (winning only 39.6% of the vote that year, from 71.5% won in 
2011) and initially congratulated the opposition (the Coalition 2016) led by Adama Barrow – 
indicating a tilt towards democratisation – before calling for a re-election, and subsequently 
forced to relinquish power by an ECOWAS regional coalition. The decision to relent 
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relations with the ROC within a year of the election also at least indicates a desire to gain 
from the PRC and therefore resuscitate the economy, which had reached a technical recession 
in 2014, at -0.94% in nominal terms, and -3.893% in per capita terms; this was the second 
such recession in a space of four years; with a nominal and per capita decline of -7.141% in 
2014 respectively (World Bank, 2019; 8 World Bank, 2019b).9 
However, after recognising China there was a marked improvement; with the nominal GDP 
growing by 4.5% in 2017. In July of the same year, there was a free trade agreement (FTA) 
signed between the PRC and The Gambia. According to President Adama Barrow, this FTA 
“will remove the need for costly transhipment of Gambian exports to China through a third 
country [and] will also make [Gambian] goods more competitive, and boost export potential 
to the world's largest market [i.e., the PRC].” The Gambia did not receive Chinese loans 
immediately following a switch in recognition (CARI, 2020). 
Case Study 6: São Tomé and Príncipe (2017) 
São Tomé and Príncipe’s switch to the PRC in 2016 came in the wake of a contentious year 
for the country as during the July 2016 presidential election, Evaristo Carvalho, a former 
Prime Minister (1994, 2002-2002) had won the plurality (at 49.8%), but nonetheless failed to 
gain an outright majority. Thus, a run-off election was called to take place in August of the 
same year. However, the incumbent president Manuel Costa, decided to withdraw in protest; 
claiming the original poll in July had been rigged. By default, then, Carvalho became 
president. 
After gaining its independence from Portugal in 1975, the island nation of São Tomé and 
Príncipe chose to form relations with the PRC, to which, as a budding socialist state on its 
own right, it had similar institutional aspirations. Then, some two decades later, in 1997, it 
established diplomatic relations with the ROC, and in turn the PRC eliminated its relations 
with STP. Once again, the São Tomé and Príncipe and PRC opened formal diplomatic 
relations in December of 2016. 
São Tomé’s decision to discontinue its relations with the ROC seems to have been motivated 
by the former’s request for more aid from the latter, and its inability or unwillingness to 
cooperate.  As a statement made public by the ROC’s Foreign Affairs Ministry stated: “The 
                                                        
8 Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=GM (Last accessed: 12 
November 2019). 
9 Available at:  https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?locations=GM (Last accessed: 12 
November 2019). 
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government of São Tomé and Príncipe ... with excessive financial difficulties, and demands 
beyond those [Taiwan] could meet, has ignored 20 years of friendly diplomatic relations, 
playing both sides of the Taiwan Strait while holding out for the highest bidder” 
(Southerland, 2017: 1). 
Likewise, São Tomé and Príncipe’s Prime Minister, Patrice Trovoada, stated to reporters that 
economic “imperatives played a role in severing ties with Taiwan,” and that the route “was 
the most correct decision for São Tomé and Príncipe....We have our program and we have a 
commitment to the people to improve their living conditions” (quoted in Southerland, 2017: 
1; emphasis added). Consistent with the findings in the other countries in the previous case 
studies, the Minister also spoke of the PRC as a “very important strategic relationship ... the 
second biggest economy in the world and permanent member of the Security Council” 
(quoted in Southerland, 2017: 1). The “dry-up” in Taiwanese aid also coincidental with the 
diplomatic freeze. Particularly, according to Bax, Gongo and Dlamini (2017: 1), there was 
“dwindling support” from the ROC side, and indeed there had been an assertion by the ROC 
that “Sao Tome had asked for more than $100 million to maintain relations,” and deemed the 
request “reckless and unfriendly” (Bax, Gongo, and Dlamini, 2017). In addition, the Sao 
Tome side claims that, “the decision to break with Taiwan was necessary to improve the lives 
of the 200,000 inhabitants of the West African archipelago” and that “China is sending 
medical aid…and a Chinese company has already expressed interest in building a deep water 
port” (Bax, Gongo, and Dlamini, 2017). However, the country has not been a recipient of 
Chinese loans following its switch to China (CARI, 2020). 
Case Study 7: Burkina Faso (2018) 
In 1961, a year following its independence from France, president Maurice Yameogo of 
Burkina Faso (which was then called the Republic of the Upper Volta), an opponent of 
communism, decided to establish formal relations with the ROC as opposed to the PRC. A 
change in course came about in the early years 1970s when, following a drought as well as an 
outbreak of measles, and the country appealed to Premier Zhou, who responded with food aid 
as well as vaccine. Subsequently, in 1973, the country’s erstwhile president, Aboubakar 
Sangoulé Lamizana, decided to form diplomatic relations with the PRC at the expense of the 
ROC. The invitation to switch relations was made by Beijing and was accompanied with 
US$48-million credit as well as several medical and farming projects. In November 1983, 
Burkina Faso’s new president (and committed socialist), Thomas Sankara, made a visit to the 
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PRC to further consolidate the relationship. But in the year 1987 a former affiliate of 
President Sankara, Blaise Compaoré, enacted a coup of his own. Nevertheless, the country 
maintained its relations with the PRC, and indeed President Compaoré was the first foreign 
head of state to go to Beijing following the Tiananmen massacre, visiting as he did in 1989. 
In early 1994, however, Burkina Faso “suddenly” switched its recognition towards the ROC 
(Verhoeven, 2014). This sudden switch was arguably “the successful result of Taiwan 
President Lee Teng-hui’s new diplomatic offensive aimed at increasing, through financial aid 
or what has been called ‘cheque book diplomacy’, the ROC’s diplomatic allies, with the aim 
of restoring Taiwan’s membership in the United Nations” (Xinhua News, 2016). Trade 
activity between the ROC and Burkina Faso is very low. By contrast, imports by the PRC 
from the latter form around 2% of its total exports; the chief exports being largely cotton, 
which forms its second export item (at around 19% in 2013). 
Imports from Burkina Faso declined measurably between 2014 and 2015 period, “partly 
because of Burkina Faso’s political unrest and owing to reduced demand in China leading to 
a drastic reduction in Chinese cotton imports” (Cabestan, 2017). But the larger obstructing 
factor in the PRC-Burkinabe trade relationship is the lack of recognition between the two 
states. This was changed in 2018, when the two countries formed formal diplomatic ties. This 
was despite prior indications that the country would maintain its relations with Taiwan. For 
example, Foreign Minister Alpha Barry had initially disclosed to a newspaper that the 
country “get ridiculous proposals telling us ‘if you sign with Beijing we’ll offer you $50 
billion or even more’” (Asia by Africa, 2018; April 22; Blanchard, 2018; May 26). This may 
have also been partially due to the fact that in the course of the 2015 electoral season, 
diplomatic sources demonstrated that one opponent of the eventual winner, Zéphirin Bagré, 
had had his campaign accept an offer of “$4.6 million from China in support of his pro-
Beijing stance” (Asia by Africa, 2018; April 22).10 
                                                        
10 Asia by Africa. 2018 (April 22). ‘Saying no to China in 2018: Taiwan's last African allies,’ Asia by Africa. 
Available at: https://www.asiabyafrica.com/point-a-to-a/taiwan-allies-africa-burkina-faso (Last accessed: 13 
November 2019). 
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Source: United Nations (2019b). 
In the wake of the recognition, the country’s exports to China grew from US$20.43 million in 
2017 to US$95.73-million, though it has not been a recipient of Chinese loans (CARI, 2020). 
6.  Conclusions and Caveats 
Of the 7 case studies conducted, two (Liberia and Burkina Faso) moved to recognise the PRC 
within a one to three-year time frame of democratising, three (Chad, Malawi and São Tomé 
and Príncipe) did so within a year of an election, and two countries seem to be outliers; 
Senegal and Gambia. However, Senegal’s switch would appear to have been motivated by a 
new president eager to differentiate himself from his predecessor, while also enhancing the 
already modestly growing economy by having relations with China. In the wake of this 
switch, the country’s exports to China grew exponentially. On the other hand, the government 
of The Gambia sort to end its relations with Taiwan and unsuccessfully sought to recognise 
the PRC; who was unwilling to recognise it due to a ‘diplomatic truce’ between Beijing and 
Taipei (2008-2015), which was also accompanied by rapprochement and ever greater 
economic cooperation between the two one China claimants. However, after the election of 
the pro-independence government of Tsai Ing-wen in 2015, China’s once again resumed the 
‘dollar diplomacy’ and formed diplomatic relations with Gambia. This begs the question of 
whether autocracies are more likely to respond to the opportunity cost when they have 
experienced a decline in aid from Taiwan, rather than from expansion of domestic pressures 
from within the populace. Notably, however, Gambia was also anticipating an election in 
2016, which the president lost and initially reneged – indicating a tilt towards democratisation 
13,99 
20,43 
95,73 
0,595 0,705 0,282 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2016 2017 2018
To
ta
l a
nn
ua
l i
m
po
rts
 (i
n 
m
ill
io
ns
 o
f 
U
S$
) 
Years 
Figure 8: ROC and PRC Imports from Burkina Faso 
PRC imports from Burkina Faso ROC imports from Burkina Faso
27 
 
– before calling for a new round of election, and subsequently forced to relinquish power by 
ECOWAS. In the midst of the campaign season, one year prior to the election of 2016, the 
country had also experienced a recession. It was perhaps in this context that the country made 
the overtures it did to the PRC. 
It bears mention that this paper’s thesis is not that China increases democracy on the 
continent; rather it is the other way around: democratisation and electoral competitiveness in 
African states in the twenty-first century (which was ascribed the role of independent variable 
in this paper) has led to recognition of China (which was in turn ascribed the role of 
dependent variable). The data has proved this, and not necessarily the reverse. 
Additionally, China’s development post-1978 has not only enabled it to achieve the amount 
of economic growth which has been the assumed in its paper to be a motivation for 
recognition by African countries in pursuit of having diplomatic relations with the PRC. 
However, China has also invested in its soft power machinery through outlets such as the 
Confucius Institutes, which presently number over 530 (Jakhar, 2019). However, this is less 
measurable on its own, and would also be competed against by the statements of African 
leaders who have emphasised economic motivations, whilst also undermining the fact that the 
African countries have switched back-and-forth between China and Taiwan (indeed, with 
many African people on the ground claiming not able to differentiate between Chinese and 
Taiwanese people (Cabestan, 2017: 495), this people-to-people aspect does not carry much 
threshold-making difference). However, rather than act as a competing variable, this could be 
a complementary variable, with African countries seeking to actualise their lessons from the 
Chinese developmental experience (e.g., trade openness and FDI attraction [Sachs, 2005]) by 
engaging in greater trade with China and drawing more FDI from China. Furthermore, 
China’s economic engagement with African countries has not been uncontroversial, with 
many observers claiming that the Asian giant is engaged in a “debt trap diplomacy” whilst 
the trade imbalance in favour of China has also been noted to be stifling the local industries. 
Indeed, in some countries, proximity to China by incumbents have been made electoral issues 
by opposition campaigns (see Matambo, 2020). These points are, however, to be viewed in 
the comparative lens utilised by this article; they may be relatively outweighed by the access 
which is in turn obtained by not recognising Taiwan. Nevertheless, this is an area for further 
research; particularly, articles could look at the effect of indebtedness to China in electoral 
campaigns along with lobbying attempts by domestic businesses who have been marginalised 
by Chinese competition. 
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Assuming perfect democratisation (by which is meant governments that are held accountable, 
that are transparent and that are not corrupt), especially in Africa, might be characterised as 
assuming a non-existent occurrence. There is nothing in the existence of a corrupt democracy 
however which precludes the relationship insofar as it is predicated on states switching to the 
PRC to make economic gains. We can still presume that the installation of new, albeit more 
corrupt governments, is still capable of being concomitant with greater amounts of elites 
among which there are ‘rents’ that need to be shared and spread out. In other words, 
democratisation is an associated variable that works in combination with this and (perhaps) 
other variables which may be at play; further, as the combination of economic stagnation of 
Taiwan compared to China which creates an opportunity cost served in this paper, 
democratisation is a process and a mechanism for the assertion of economic/developmental 
pressures that result in switches rather than an end in itself. It is in this regard necessarily tied 
to situational circumstances, and thereby accommodates and channels a multitude of other 
variables to various policy outcomes in which choosing which China to recognise has been 
only one occupation in the multi-faceted practice of African statecraft. 
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